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MONGOLIA’S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL REGIME:
INSTITUTIONAL TENSIONS AND POLITICAL
CONSEQUENCES*
H. Hulan
The struggle to strengthen the new democracies in Eastern Europe and
Central Asia has led to an international academic and political debate about the
nature of social transformations there and the difficult decisions, at times in-
volving excruciating and bitter ethical choices, concerning economic restructur-
ing, political institution-building and the basic values of equity, equality, and
justice.
The international debate has produced provocative hypotheses about the
effects of institutions on democracy. It forms part of the “new institutionalism”
literature in comparative political studies that holds as a premise that political
democratic transformation depends not only on economic and social conditions
but also on the design of political institutions.1
One of the most important institutional issues that is only beginning to
draw scholarly attention is related to the influence of different constitutional
frameworks on democratic development: a stable consolidation of representa-
tive state institutions, a clear-cut and balanced method of checking executive
and legislative powers, transparent mechanisms of decision-making in all
branches of government, and a democratic consolidation of multi-party sys-
tems. New constitutions are   necessarily an   exercise   in   political   and
Institutional engineering in countries where polities are being reconstructed.
They bear the political marks of the struggle between the new and the old in
politics of respective countries reflecting both their recent political histories and
the scope and dimension of political changes in many respects, new constitu-
tions in Eastern Europe and Central Asia have either strengthened or weakened
institutional incentives for democratic consolidation. In order to be able to ex-
plain the impact of Mongolia’s new constitution on the democratic consolida-
*This article was originally prepared for the workshop on ‘The Greater Mongolia in the
Twentieth Century’ at Princeton University, February 3-4, 1995.
1 Alfred Stefan and Cindy Sketch give a brief overview of the ‘new institutionalism’ literature
in their ‘Constitutional frameworks and democratic consolidation: Parliamentarianism vs.
presidential’, World Politics 46:1 (October 1993), 1-22.
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tion and the overall political process in the country, one has to look into the
historical and political setting against which the first democratic Mongolian
constitution emerged.
The political transformation in Central Asia is essentially conducted in
two different ways as far as the sequence of political and economic reforms and
the speed of change are concerned: One is a politically decentralized way, found
in Mongolia, and the second is an authoritarian bureaucratic way (the “Chinese
model”) found in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and smaller Central Asian states. The
Mongolian model, simultaneously implementing market economy reforms and
sweeping political changes, displays the dilemmas of a semi-nomadic society
struggling to curtail its “Asian nomadic” and make a breakthrough into the
world of modernity, prosperity, and diversity. The specifics of the Mongolian
model were brought about by its political and economic status as the closest
Soviet satellite.
In late 1989 and early 1990, Mongolia became involved in a process of
political emancipation. Triggered by the political changes in the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe, intellectual and political dissatisfaction with the dominant
Communist Party, a rigid centrally planned economy, and Mongolia’s satellite
status translated into demands for changing the political regime so that it would
incorporate freedom of thought, political choice and social justice.2
The intellectual and political aspirations of young democrats were clearly
beyond the traditional socio-political paradigm and were something new for
most Mongols. The discrepancy between the “intellectual mobilization” and its
political manifestation on the one hand, and the economic and socio-political
reality of a backward Central Asian society on the other hand was bridged by
the fusion of the democratic and nationalistic goals formulated by the demo-
crats. The dominance of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP)
was seen as a political arrangement for perpetuating the Mongols’ inferior politi-
cal status, and as the quintessential expression of the interests of a foreign
power. Consequently, removal of the MPRP’s political control was perceived as
ridding the country of the old regime and as an act of political decolonization.
In March 1990, facing the biggest threat ever to its survival the MPRP
changed its leadership, restructured the government, and abandoned the one-
party system. The country’s former rubber-stamp legislature, the People’s Great
2 Political and cultural aspects of Mongolia: s social transformation are treated in my report
at the UNDP workshop on transition at the Ost-West Wirtschtftttkadamie, Berlin, Sep-
tember 27-October 7, 1993, and my article ‘Mongolia’s political transformation’ The
Mongolian Journal of international AfBdn 1 (1994), 28-37.
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Khural, adopted amendments to the 1960 Constitution that provided for a tran-
sitional political system and multi-party elections.
The first open and free elections, in July 1990, resulted in the formation of
a multi-party legislature, with the young democratic opposition parties taking
forty percent of the seats in the standing legislature, the Baga Khural, created
by the 1990 constitutional amendments., and a coalition government including
members of the MPRP reformist faction, the National Progress Party and the
Democratic Party. Both the President and Prime Minister were elected by the
non-standing legislature, the Great People’s Khural.
The fragile nature of the political consensus reached in 1990 and 1991 by
the reformist faction of the MPRP with both the democrats and its own party’s
conservative majority led the new political elite to realize the urgent need for a
new constitution which would legitimize the emerging political and economic
institutions. A sense of urgency was added by a belief generally shared among
the leaders of the Baga Khural about the international situation. To the south,
China was pursuing its politically rigid strategy of “building socialism with
Chinese characteristics”, and to the north, Russia had been thrown into a politi-
cal, economic, constitutional, and federal turmoil. A new constitution would
establish a domestic framework for a continued open foreign policy and a new
international orientation.
Moreover, as soon as news reached Ulaanbaatar about the attempted
coup detach in the Soviet Union in 1991, a conservative group of Mongolian
politicians switched sides. The democrats took this incident as yet another
incentive to make the country’s transformation irreversible. They were con-
vinced that the creation of the rule of law required a moral and political commit-
ment on their part to proceed with the transformation in accordance with law
rather than in defiance of it or in a legal vacuum.3
The two factions within the ruling MPRP were also in favor of a speedy
passage of the new constitution, albeit for different motivations. The reformists
heading the cabinet in 1991 shared the concerns of the democrats. The conser-
vatives, on the other hand, wanted to use the constitutional process to ensure
their party a political and institutional advantage by using their majority in both
the Baga Khural and the Great People’s Khural. The MPRP feared that contin-
ued reform would jeopardize its political survival and that it might even lose its
considerable material and financial assets
3 In 1990-1991 the author worked in the Baga Khural where she had an opportunity to hear
the views of leading politicians on the new constitutional regime.
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It is important to emphasize that both the democrats and the MPRP viewed
the constitutional issue as an important guarantee for the peaceful change that
marked Mongolia’s transition, which was in marked contrast to the volatile and
antagonistic dynamics in Russia and other post-communist countries.
The deliberations over the final constitutional draft started in November
1991 and lasted for two and a half months instead of the three weeks planned by
President Ochirbat and his drafting commission. Right from the first day it be-
came clear that the debate would be heated.4 It involved such issues as the type
of representative government, the type of legislature, the number of deputies,
the election of the president, property rights, land ownership, and the country’s
name.
When the Constitution was finally adopted on January 13, 1992, it was the
product of a compromise the democrats reached with the conservatives and
nationalists. It was not only time pressure that persuaded them to compromise
but also an increasing sense of disillusion with the reform process which re-
vealed an abysmal lack of knowledge about democratic government and the rise
of a childlike desire for instant gratification.
The compromise had its price. The final draft, carefully drawn up by the
commission, with logically coherent provisions and precise details, was scuttled
in favor of a hybrid system that prevents increased political participation and
the further democratization of the entire political system.
The 1992 Constitution is the first document in Mongolia’s history that
incorporates individual political rights and freedoms, and an independent judi-
ciary. It declares democracy, justice, freedom, equality, and national unity as the
premier goals of Mongolian society, and it recognizes all forms of property
ownership with legal protection for ownership rights. All in all, in spite of the
last-minute compromises, one can view this document as a great accomplish-
ment in a semi-nomadic country which was geographically far removed from the
global experience of democracy and representative government.
The fundamental aim of the constitution was to establish the basic rules of
government reflecting the philosophy of representative government. It is well
known that there are three basic types of representative government in the
world today: the presidential (as in the United States), the parliamentary (as in
most of Western Europe), and the semi-presidential where a president elected
by universal suffrage coexists with a prime minister and cabinet responsible to
4 The constitutional debate in the Great People’s Khural and the major provisions of the
1992 Constitution are discussed in Alan Sanders, ‘Mongolia’s new constitution: Blueprint
for democracy’ Asian Survey 32:6 (1992), pp.506-520.
39
 Number 3, 1996The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs
the legislature (as in France). A parliamentary regime is a system of mutual
dependence where the chief executive power must be supported by a majority in
the legislature and has the capacity to dissolve the legislature and call for elec-
tions. A presidential regime is a system of mutual independence where both the
legislative and executive powers have fixed electoral mandates and their own
source of legitimacy.5 It follows that a semi-presidential regime would be a mixed
version of these two which   have   mutually incompatible characteristics.
The 1992 Constitution established something like a semi-presidential re-
gime which injected ambiguity into the political system and thus affected the
parameters of action and the strategies to be adopted by parties and other
political actors. In an emerging democracy, the origins and evolution of demo-
cratic institutions and procedures are determined more by members of the politi-
cal elite than by abstract cultural factors. In Mongolia’s case, the result was a
semi-presidential regime favored by the conservatives in the MPRP, and provi-
sions for human rights and property ownership favored by the democrats.
The original draft of the Constitution was intended to consolidate the
parliamentary system with its indirect election of a president. It was prepared by
the commission which included the democratically-oriented leaders of the Baga
Khural and of the new parties. They emphasized the need for a parliamentary
regime in a country with strong authoritarian traditions, and they feared that in
a presidential regime, with institutional but not necessarily political indepen-
dence of the two main branches of government, a president might usurp power.
Not surprisingly, the MPRP insisted on a presidential system, basing its conten-
tion on two observations. It claimed that a presidential system would eliminate
the “social anarchy” which it blamed on the democratic process, and it played
up Mongolia’s long tradition of authoritarian rule dating back to the glorious
days of Chinggis Khan’s empire. The latter argument was, of course, a blatant
appeal to the nationalists among the intellectual and rural deputies in the Great
People’s Khural. In the end, the democrats and the MPRP conservatives settled
for a compromise whereby there was created an extremely powerful legislature
on the one hand, and a directly elected president on the other hand.6 In keeping
with the idea of the presidential system, the Constitution provides for a separa-
tion of the executive, legislative, and judicial powers.7
5 Stefan and Shell, 3-4.
6 Mongol Ulsyn Undsen Khuul [The Constitution of Mongolia]. Ulaanbaatar 1992. Chg.,
sections 1-3.
7  Ibid, Articles 20, 38, 47.
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The State Great Khural (SGK), a 76-member unicameral legislature, is the
supreme organ of state and legislative power. It enacts laws and supervises their
implementation, determines the laws of domestic, financial, monetary, and for-
eign policy, approves the budget, sets the dates for legislative and presidential
elections, removes or relieves the president, appoints and replaces the prime
minister and other officials accountable to the SGK, determines the organization
and role of the National Security Council (chaired by the president), holds na-
tional referenda, ratifies and vetoes international agreements, establishes and
severs diplomatic relations, and declares a state of emergency or war.8 The
president, upon consultation with the prime minister, can propose a dissolution
of the SGK, but two-thirds of its members must actually agree to it.9
The president is elected by universal suffrage and is the head of state and
the symbol of national unity.10 He may not concurrently serve as a member of the
cabinet or the SGK. Each parliamentary party or group of parties may nominate
a candidate in presidential elections. A candidate who receives a majority of the
popular vote is considered elected and the SGK will pass a law recognizing his
or her mandate. If no one receives a majority, a run-off election will be held
between the two leading candidates.
The president has the power to veto all or parts of any legislation, with a
two-third’s majority of the SGK needed to override the veto; select, in consulta-
tion with the majority party or a group of parties, the prime minister; instruct the
cabinet and issue decrees with policy guidelines effective only upon the prime
minister’s signature; represent Mongolia in foreign relations and enter into in-
ternational treaties; serve as commander-in-chief and head of the National Secu-
rity Council; declare general or partial conscription; declare a state of emer-
gency or war, with the SGK’s approval within seven days.11 The president is
accountable to the SGK, which may invalidate his decrees and, upon findings of
illegality by the Constitutional Court, remove him from office.12 in the president’s
absence, incapacity or resignation, the chairman of the SGK exercises presiden-
tial power until a new president is inaugurated.13
The existence of a powerful legislature and a powerful prime-ministerial
office undermines the principle of the separation of power by fusing legislative
and executive powers by means of majority rule in the SGK. This fusion also
8 Ibid, Article 25.
9  Ibid., Article 22.
10 Ibid., Article 30.
11 Ibid. Article 33.
I2 Ibid., Article 35.
13 Ibid., Article 37.
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runs counter to the political separation of state institutions as prescribed by the
presidential regime’s rules of the game. The parliamentary regime’s rules estab-
lish a mutual dependence between parliament, the prime minister, and, in
Mongolia’s case, the president who has a share of executive responsibility.
Complicating this mixture is the fact that the Mongolian president as the symbol
of national unity has to renounce any political party affiliation even though the
president is initially chosen by one or more parties in the SGK. Moreover, the
president’s formal political neutrality is compromised by the right to initiate and
veto legislation and issue decrees. Despite the president’s legislative powers,
his right to give policy guidelines to the cabinet must be countersigned by the
prime minister, thereby sharply reducing the president’s political and institu-
tional authority.
The Mongolian constitutional regime becomes still more ambiguous when
set against the current electoral law which became operational with the 1992
parliamentary elections. The multi-member plurality electoral system, which over
time turns into a two-party system, leaves virtually no political role for the
president. Once in office, his party can abandon him if its leaders realize they
could improve their fortunes by disassociating their party from the president,
and, when his party is in opposition, it can manipulate him in order to thwart the
majority party’s legislative agenda.
There are few semi-presidential regimes in the world, and the, successful
ones are even fewer. In fact, such a system could work if, under certain circum-
stances, it operates under the rules of either a presidential or a parliamentary
regime. In Mongolia, such a choice is extremely difficult because of the domi-
nance of one party in the wake of the 1992 parliamentary elections and the
resulting lack of an institutionalized opposition in parliament.
The first directly elected president, Punsalmaagijn Ochirbat, became a re-
formist member of the ruling MPRP in 1990 and ran in 1993 on the combined
ticket of the National Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party which
form a tiny parliamentary opposition. In doing so, he further alienated the con-
servative majority of his own party. His victory in spite of a smear campaign
launched by his party antagonized many members of the cabinet and the legis-
lative majority. This experience continually frustrates President Ochirbat’s ef-
forts to build a working relationship with the legislative majority, the cabinet,
and the ruling party. He is constantly obliged to create working coalitions on his
side of the fence in order to be effective in the discharge of his constitutional
duties.
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The leadership structure of the dominant MPRP is another stumbling block
for the new constitutional regime. Since 1990 the party’s secretary-general has
been placed outside both the cabinet and parliament, which is a continuation of
the party’s survival strategy but calls into question its right to criticize the cabinet
An even more awkward consequence is the fact that the president, in order to
forge a working coalition, has to approach the MPRP outside the institutional
framework of the state, a maneuver that may violate his constitutional role
The ambiguous nature of Mongolia’s constitutional regime makes its op-
eration dependent not on constitutional rules but on the nature of the party
system, the electoral system, the legislative majority, and the nature of informal
personal relationships within the country’s political elite. This excessive reli-
ance on the political elite is dangerous in any country and especially in a small
country such as Mongolia.
If  Mongolia wishes to eliminate the present ambiguities and strengthen
its democratic institutions, it must make three major choices:
1.       whether to continue the present ambiguity which threatens direct popular
participation or to make the presidency more workable;
2.       whether to continue with an electoral system which exaggerates the gains
made by the winning party or opt for a system which allows diversity in
parliament and gives the president a chance to fulfill his constitutional
obligations; and
3.        whether to keep the present “executive dualism” of the president and prime
minister or provide for a division of labor between the two, thus making
the decision-making process more transparent and the institutions more
accountable.
Under present conditions, the only way to make the presidency more
workable is to have a president whose agenda is more in line with that of the
MPRP. But a triumvirate at the top of Mongolia’s political pyramid would leave
almost no room for the checks and balances provided for in the Constitution.
Mongolia’s best option, without threatening the fragile balance between
the economic rights of citizens and the governmental system provided for in the
Constitution, is to introduce a proportions! Representation electoral system
which would reflect the country’s multi-party reality. It would facilitate the ex-
ecution of the president’s constitutional duty as unifier of the country’s political
system. The MPRP, however, is not likely to agree to such a change because it
would jeopardize its present dominance. As a result, it will require deliberate and
sustained efforts on the part of all democratically minded members of the politi-
cal elite to continue democratic consolidation in Mongolia.
